Introduction
The nature of consumer response to a price promotion is of substantial importance to managers and has received considerable attention in the literature (see Blattberg and Neslin 1990 ). Recent studies (e.g., Bell, Chiang and Padmanabhan 1999; van Heerde, Lee°ang and Wittink 2000) demonstrate that the primary demand expansion e®ect of a promotion can be signi¯cantly larger than previously thought (e.g., Chiang 1991; Gupta 1988) . Primary demand expansion is distinct from secondary demand shifting created by brand switching in a category: It is an increase in the overall category volume. A necessary but not su±-cient condition for promotion-induced primary demand expansion is that consumers purchase higher than usual quantities in response to a price promotion. To ascertain the true primary demand e®ect of a promotion, it is important to distinguish the case of pure stockpiling from that of°exible consumption: i.e., additional consumption induced by the presence of additional inventory on hand.
When consumers stockpile without increasing consumption, one observes a temporary expansion in demand, i.e., an increase in purchase quantity in response to a price promotion, followed by a longer than normal elapsed time before consumers re-enter the market for a subsequent purchase. This is quite di®erent from a situation where the promotion-induced increase in purchase quantities does not signi¯cantly extend the time until the next purchase in the category, implying that there has been an increase in consumption. Figure 1 illustrates both cases.
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[ Figure 1 about here ]
The inventory e®ect is depicted in the bottom half of the¯gure: Higher inventory levels create primary demand expansion by endogenously increasing the usage rate of the consumer.
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A number of experimental and behavioral studies show that increased inventory on hand leads to increased consumption of the product (see for example, Moore and 1   F  o  r  e  a  s  e  o  f  e  x  p  o  s  i  t  i  o  n  t  h  i  s  i  l  l  u  s  t  r  a  t  i  o  n  a  s  s  u  m  e  s  t  h  a  t  t  h  e  c  o  n  s  u  m  p  t  i  o  n  r  a  t  e  i  s  a  p  p  r  o  x  i  m  a  t  e  l  y  l  i  n  e  a  r  s  o  t  h  e  t  w  o  c  a  s  e  s  c  a  n  b  e  d  i  s  t  i  n  g  u  i  s  h  e  d  b  y  t  h  e  c  o  m  p  a  r  i  n  g  t  h  e  s  l  o  p  e  s  o  f  t  h  e  c  o  n  s  u  m  p  t  i  o  n  l  i  n  e  .   2   I  n  k  e  e  p  i  n  g  w  i  t  h  e  x  i  s  t  i  n  g  l  i  t  e  r  a  t  u  r  e  w  e  u  s  e  t  h  e  t  e  r  m  s  \  c  o  n  s  u  m  p  t  i  o  n  e  ®  e  c  t  "  a  n  d  \  i  n  v  e  n  t  o  r  y  e  ®  o  r  t  "  i  n  t  e  r  -c  h  a  n  g  e  a  b  l  y  .  I  n  b  o  t  h  i  n  s  t  a  n  c  e  s  w  e  r  e  f  e  r  t  o  t  h  e  s  i  t  u  a  t  i  o  n  i  n  w  h  i  c  h  a  n  i  n  c  r  e  a  s  e  i  n  i  n  v  e  n  t  o  r  y  o  n  h  a  n  d  l  e  a  d  s  t  o  a  n  i  n  c  r  e  a  s  e  i  n  c  o  n  s  u  m  p  t and estimates a dynamic structural model in which consumers make consumption decisions in accordance with both inventory levels and expectations about upcoming promotions. Shē nds that in the tuna category, higher levels of inventory on hand lead to increases in consumption.
Collectively, these empirical¯ndings raise the following research issue: How might the competitive pricing strategies of¯rms di®er in categories that show only stockpiling, stockpiling plus consumption, or neither e®ect? This paper develops a model of price competition between¯rms to answer the following questions:
² What should¯rms in retail markets do with regard to their price and promotional strategies for a product that exhibits stockpiling e®ects and consumption increases induced by stockpiling?
² How would the nature of price competition di®er for a product that exhibits only stockpiling but no consumption e®ects?
² Is price competition more or less intense in markets with more pronounced consumption e®ects?
Given that previous research has empirically established the existence of both stockpiling and°exible consumption e®ects, we start with a game-theoretic model of price competition that captures consumer behavior on these dimensions. The model is based on the economics of consumer search in a market where consumers have imperfect price information. Salop and Stiglitz (1982) have shown that consumer stockpiling and imperfect price information lead to price dispersion even in a market with ex-ante identical consumers. The intuition is that 3   T  h  e  y  a  l  s  o  r  e  p  o  r  t  o  t  h  e  r  t  h  a  t  o  t  h  e  r  c  a  t  e  g  o  r  i  e  s  (  e  .  g  .  ,  b  u  t  t  e  r  ,  d  r  y  e  r  s  o  f  t  n  e  r  s  ,  i  c  e  c  r  e  a  m  ,  m  a  r  g  a  r  i  n  e  a  n  d  s  u  g  a  r  )  s  h  o  w  n  e  i  t  h  e  r  e  ®  e  c  t  . in any given period, some¯rms might o®er low prices (promotions) to generate additional sales from consumers who stockpile, while others choose to forego these consumers to get the bene¯t of higher prices. Thus, the presence of consumer stockpiling can give rise to price promotions as an equilibrium outcome in a competitive market.
In this paper, we go beyond the \pure" stockpiling phenomenon to integrate both stockpiling and consumption behaviors at the individual consumer level. That is, we allow the possibility that stockpiling can create the°exible consumption e®ect described above and illustrated in Figure 1 (b). In our model, consumers who decide to stockpile in response to promotion face the possibility that excess household stock might induce them to indulge in additional consumption. We establish how the equilibrium pricing strategies under competition respond to consumers' stockpiling and°exible consumption behaviors.
The model delivers several insights pertaining to impact of the consumption e®ect on price competition. First, the consumption e®ect motivates¯rms in retail markets to o®er deeper promotions in equilibrium. The rationale is as follows: In the presence of this e®ect, consumers who decide to stockpile additional units anticipate that they might indulge in additional consumption. This implies that despite stockpiling, these consumers might have to re-enter the market, face price uncertainty and the prospect of landing up at a high-priced store. This leads them to have a diminishing marginal utility for the additional units, forcing the¯rms to choose lower promotional prices in equilibrium. Thus, the consumption e®ect leads¯rms to compete by o®ering price promotions of greater depth. We also¯nd that rms o®er more frequent promotions in categories that exhibit consumption e®ects. Taken together, these¯ndings imply that price competition is more intense in product categories (or markets) with stronger consumption e®ects and this in turn leads to lower equilibrium pro¯ts and lower average market prices. In addition, we show that higher consumer inventory holding costs lead to smaller promotional depth. Higher holding costs also reduce the intensity of market competition and lead to an increase in the average market price and the equilibrium pro¯ts.
Our analysis not only shows why the consumption e®ect can intensify price competition, but also produces speci¯c predictions pertaining to the promotional price levels and the frequency with which¯rms will promote. To test the implications of the theory, we use store and household-level scanner panel data on price, promotion and purchase information. In particular, we test the following three model predictions:
1. The frequency of promotions is higher in categories that show the consumption e®ect.
This implies that the proportion of stores o®ering a promotional price in any given period is higher in categories that show consumption e®ects.
2. The ratio of deal price to regular price is lower in these categories.
3. The ratio of average price to regular price is also lower.
In the empirical analysis, we use data on 4,313 skus from categories identi¯ed in a previously published paper (Bell et al, 1999) as showing stockpiling and/or consumption e®ects. The di®erences between these category types (and a list of the categories used) is as follows.
There are four pure stockpiling categories: bathroom tissue, co®ee, detergents and paper towels. In these categories a promotional price leads to higher quantities purchased but not to greater consumption. There are four consumption e®ect categories in which a promotional price leads to stockpiling and also increased consumption: bacon, salted snacks, soft drinks and yogurt. The no-stockpiling condition in the theoretical model occurs when consumers encounter the regular/high price and purchase su±cient quantities for current consumption only.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background by way of a brief review of related research. We present the model and structure of the game in section 3. Section 4 provides the theoretical results and compares and contrasts the two cases of pure stockpiling and°exible consumption. The data, empirical models, analysis and results are given in section 5, and section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion and implications for further research.
Background and Related Literature
There is a rich tradition of research on price promotions in both the marketing and industrial organization literatures. The issues examined range from the economic and strategic rationales for price promotions, to the empirical estimation of promotional e®ects and their managerial implications, and¯nally to the psychological consequences of price promotions on consumer behavior and decision making. While this paper is most closely related to thē rst two literatures, it also draws on the latter. By way of summarizing the extant literature, we elaborate brie°y on key¯ndings from some of the relevant research.
Why Do Firms O®er Promotions?
Prevailing economic rationales for why¯rms o®er price promotions focus on the following factors: (i) inherent demand uncertainty (Lazear 1986 ), (ii) inventory-cost shifting (Blattberg, Eppen and Lieberman 1981), (iii) consumer heterogeneity with respect to information on market prices (Varian 1980 ), (iv) price discrimination (Narasimhan 1984) , and (v) consumer stockpiling (Salop and Stiglitz 1982) . Each rationale addresses a di®erent aspect of consumer behavior or market dynamics.
Lazear (1986) analyzes the role of promotions when sellers are faced with demand uncertainty and provides a rationale for the clearence sales phenomenon. Promotion is viewed as a tool for capitalizing on the inherently stochastic nature of demand. Blattberg et al (1981) present another rationale: Promotions help shift inventory holding costs from the retailer to the individual consumer because they encourage consumers to stockpile. The idea here is that it is more e±cient for individual consumers to bear these costs separately, rather than have them consolidated and borne in totality by the retailer. Blattberg et al (1981) test the predictions of this theory empirically using dairy panel data for four product categories and nd that consumers stockpile in all cases.
In an in°uential paper, Varian (1980) established the idea of promotions as a mixed strategy price equilibrium in response to the di®erences among consumers in whether or not they are informed about market prices. Similarly, Narasimhan (1988) and Raju, Lal and Srinivasan (1990) examine price promotions as mixed strategies in response to di®erences in brand loyalty among consumers. Another rationale is provided in Narasimhan (1984) which shows that coupon promotions can be used as price discrimination devices. They help¯rms to take advantage of heterogeneity in consumer time costs of collecting and using coupons.
In a paper that is most closely related to our work, Salop and Stiglitz (1982) show that consumer stockpiling and imperfect information about prices can lead to price promotions as an equilibrium outcome in a competitive market. Price dispersion can arise even if¯rms and consumers are ex-ante identical because in any given period some¯rms can o®er promotions to take advantage of consumer stockpiling. This rationale for promotions has received relatively little attention in the marketing literature and is most closely related to this paper.
Perhaps the smaller perceived occurrence of the primary demand e®ect of a promotion (and the early empirical¯ndings which support the notion that such e®ects are dominated by brand switching), is part of the reason for this. Given the emerging stream of empirical and experimental studies that report the incidence of primary demand e®ects (and especially the consumption e®ect) is greater than previously thought, the research question of how these e®ects relate to retail competition and the use of price promotions becomes important.
Finally, there are several other analytical papers that o®er a rich analysis of rational consumer behavior { but treat¯rm pricing and promotional decisions as exogenous to the consumer problem. Assuncao and Meyer (1993) , for example, examine the normative implications of price promotions for temporal buying and consumption behavior. Consumers anticipate prices through a¯rst-order markov process, and as a result, the rational shop-ping policy dictates that consumption rates should: (a) increase in household inventories, (b) increase with holding costs, and (c) decrease with temporal discounting. In a related study, Ho, Tang and Bell (1998) extend this idea and show that a rational cost-minimizing consumer will increase consumption when faced with increased price variation. This secondorder e®ect is derived under the assumption of a stationary price distribution with price variation increasing over a mean-preserving spread. Krishna (1992) builds on the work of Golabi (1985) to show that the volume of product bought on deal decreases with promotion frequency. This analytical¯nding is also supported in the work of Helsen and Schmittlein (1992) and Foekens, Lee°ang and Wittink (1999) .
While none of the above papers addresses equilibrium pricing behavior under price competition, they nevertheless show a clear link between promotions and consumer behavior in the form of stockpiling and increased consumption. As such, they provide support for our model structure in which rational consumers maximize inter-temporal expected utility and independent¯rms compete in prices.
How to Estimate Price Promotion E®ects?
Gupta (1988) calibrates a model on scanner panel data and¯nds that the predominant e®ect of a price promotion is on brand switching, and therefore secondary demand. This view is also supported in subsequent work by Chiang (1991) and Chintagunta (1993) . With the advent of larger databases with more product categories, recent research (e.g., Bell et al 1999) has shown that primary demand e®ects of price promotions can be signi¯cant and that their importance varies considerably across categories. Similarly, Van Heerde et al (2000) in their analysis of pre-and post-promotion dips¯nd some evidence of primary demand expansion. Nijs et al (2001, p. 11)¯nd \: : : price promotions signi¯cantly expand category demand in 58% of the cases over a dust-settling period that lasts, on average, 10 weeks." In the \long run", however, these e®ects appear to die out.
Thus, while some evidence for the primary demand e®ect has started to emerge, almost all empirical studies do not explicity address the behavioral mechanisms that lead to primary demand expansion. That is, the econometric formulation typically assumes that consumption rates vary across individuals, but are exogenous and¯xed (i.e., consumers behave according to the pattern given in Figure 1 be driven up by increases in household inventories. In sum, there is a good deal of empirical support for the idea that promotional tactics employed by¯rms stimulate stockpiling behavior and lead to increases in consumption. This consumer behavior phenomenon not only exhibits high internal validity (i.e., it can be generated as an outcome of rational consumer decision making), but also external validity (i.e., it appears to exist in real markets).
Model
To relate promotions to stockpiling and consumption, we need to develop a model that is able to capture consumption dynamics at the individual consumer level. The framework must allow a consumer the option to not only buy the good for present consumption but also to store it for future consumption. In addition, it must capture the possibility that stockpiling might result in additional consumption.
4
In this section we¯rst describe the assumptions that allow us to characterize consumer and¯rm behavior and then outline the solution to the game.
Model Assumptions
Consumer Market and Consumer Decisions
The market consists of T consumers who are homogenous in their valuation, u; per-unit of the product. Consumers have a two-period consumption/planning horizon (this twoperiod assumption allows us to model inter-temporal purchase dynamics). More precisely, the two \periods" should be thought of a pertaining to two possible purchase occasions that a consumer faces within a planning cycle (we will continue to use the term \periods" for expositional ease). On any given purchase occasion, consumers do not know the price charged by a particular store but know a priori only the distribution of prices, f (p), that they will encounter. Given price uncertainty, we assume that consumers randomly select a store. With a planning cycle of two periods, consumers are assumed to choose from two alternative shopping strategies: enter the market to buy a second unit at the price encountered in period 2. In this case, the consumer incurs a transaction cost, c, of entering the market again in the second period. We assume that if the consumer only bought one unit in period 1, she will have a maximum demand of 2 units over the entire planning cycle (one unit pertaining to each period). In other words, if only one unit is bought in period 1, there is no stockpiling and therefore no opportunity for additional consumption.
2. Stockpiling Strategy. Alternatively, if the price encountered in period 1 is found to be attractive enough, then the consumer can choose a stockpiling strategy in which it is assumed that the consumer is able to stockpile an additional unit of the product.
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Thus, a consumer's stockpiling strategy will involve her purchasing two units in period 1: One unit for current consumption and a second unit that can be stored for future consumption. The consumer stockpiles the additional unit to potentially avoid the need to re-enter the market in period 2. As a result, the consumer avoids the possibility of encountering a high price in the second period and also saves on the transaction cost c of re-entering the market. However, the consumer will incur a holding/storage cost, h, if she ends up storing the second unit, where h captures the cost of physical storage as well as spoilage costs. The physical storage costs can be due to the bulkiness of the product or due to the extent of valuable freezer/refrigerator space used. Spoilage costs are relevant for perishable categories.
Introducing the Consumption E®ect Created by Stockpiling
Allowing consumers to choose to buy two units in period 1 and store one unit (at the holding cost h) for future consumption captures the possibility of consumer stockpiling. But the consumer model must also capture the consumption e®ect. This e®ect is relevant only for those consumers who adopt the stockpiling strategy and purchase two units in period 1. Upon stockpiling these consumers face one of the following two states. With probability µ 2 (0; 1) a consumer who has stockpiled consumes both the units (and enjoys consumption utility 2u) in the¯rst period.
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In this case, the consumer will re-enter the market despite buying the two units, but will not have to incur the cost of storage. In the second state, which happens with the probability (1 ¡ µ), a consumer who purchases two units in the¯rst period, consumes only one unit of the product (and enjoys a utility of u) in the¯rst period and stockpiles the second for future consumption at the storage cost of h: Obviously, in this event, the consumer does not need to re-enter the market. Finally, note that in period 2 the planning cycle ends and the consumer has utility for only up to one unit of consumption in this period.
The state-dependent utility described above can be interpreted as follows: At the time of purchase in period 1, consumers are uncertain as to whether or not they will indulge in additional consumption, but have knowledge of the value of µ for the product. Consider the example of the purchase of soft drinks versus that of detergent by a consumer. At the time of purchase the consumer knows that, conditional on availability, she is more likely to consume additional quantities of soft drinks than detergent. However, the actual additional consumption of soft drinks is uncertain. For example, additional consumption of soft drinks for an individual consumer could be triggered by idiosyncratic complementary events such a favorite movie, or an unexpected visit by a friend, etc. Thus one can interpret µ as a product category characteristic that represents the \ex-ante" belief that consumers have about the likelihood of additional consumption in that category, while the actual realization of µ can be thought of as being related to idiosyncratic consumption events. It should be noted that in our empirical test, we explicitly recognize consumer heterogeneity when linking the theory to the data. In particular, we estimate°exible, hierarchical random e®ects models which allow the possibility that speci¯c skus and consumers within a category exhibit idiosyncratic e®ects which are distributed around a category-level mean.
Consumers are rational and as such the rationality requirement implies that in period 1 they make decisions by maximizing their full inter-temporal expected utility. In other words, in deciding whether or not to stockpile in period 1, consumers anticipate the fact that stockpiling might result in additional consumption thereby forcing them to re-enter the market and to face price uncertainty. Consumers maximize their inter-temporal expected utility over the two periods based upon this anticipation. Finally, one can see that the period 2 decision of the consumer is to simply decide whether or not to buy one unit given the price encountered.
Firms
The retail market consists of n ex-ante identical retailers. This assumption eliminates the possibility that individual retailer characteristics drive any price dispersion in the market.
As a result, any observed price dispersion will be purely due to the strategic price choices of the retailers in equilibrium. Retailers have constant marginal cost of production for the good which can be normalized to zero without any loss of generality.
Market Equilibrium
Each¯rm in the retail market chooses a pricing strategy to maximize pro¯ts over the planning cycle, given the prices of the other¯rms. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, each¯rm will choose a strategy pro¯le that makes its competitors indi®erent between their strategies. We establish the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the model. Furthermore, in equilibrium each consumer searches optimally in response to f ¤ (p) (the equilibrium price distribution that she faces) and buys only if she gets non-negative surplus. The mixed strategy equilibrium has the advantage that it re°ects Hi-Lo promotional competition that characterizes the retail grocery industry that we examine. Moreover, it implies the following feature: consumers who re-enter the market after stocking out face price uncertainty. 7 
Theoretical Results
We are interested in understanding the impact of stockpiling and the consumption e®ect on behavior, so it is necessary to establish the exact conditions under which stockpiling occurs.
To do this we must¯rst calculate the threshold price that determines whether or not the consumer stockpiles at all. Subsequently, we proceed to describe the case where consumers stockpile but where stockpiling does not lead to an increase in consumption (µ = 0) and then the main case where stockpiling leads to additional consumption (µ > 0).
General Condition
The¯rst task is to identify the feasible prices in the mixed strategy pro¯le. In period 1 consumers have to choose between buying one unit of the good for current consumption only or two units for current and future consumption. Consequently, the decision to buy two units in period 1 versus one unit involves a tradeo® between buy-and-hold versus shopping in the future period. This implies a \threshold" price,p; which makes the consumer indi®erent between the two choices.
Consider that consumers encounter a store charging a pricep and decide to buy 2 units in period 1. With probability µ these consumers will consume both units in the¯rst period itself and will need to re-enter the market in the second period for an additional unit. In any mixed strategy that¯rms adopt for the planning cycle, consumers who re-enter the market will have to face price uncertainty while purchasing the additional unit. Denoting the expectation of the price distribution f(p) as ¹ p; their total (expected) utility from this eventuality is 3u ¡ 2p ¡ ¹ p ¡ c. Alternatively, with probability 1 ¡ µ they will not consume the second unit in the¯rst period and their total utility in this scenario is 2u ¡ 2p ¡ h.
Consequently, their expected utility from stockpiling in the¯rst period is:
In contrast, consider the utility obtained by the consumer who decides not to stockpile in the¯rst period. Such a consumer will buy one unit of the good atp and will re-enter the market in period 2 for the second unit. In doing so the consumer incurs the transaction cost c for re-entering and also faces the uncertain price distribution f (p): We have the expected utility of such a consumer as E(U n s ) which implies the threshold price:
In addition, we have to check that in equilibrium E(U s )¸0; otherwise buying two units and stockpiling will not be a feasible strategy for the consumer.
The next step in the analysis is to show that the mixed strategy pro¯le in a symmetric equilibrium will involve at most two prices (denoted henceforth as p Because consumers shop randomly, it will be the case that all stores get the same number of consumers. Suppose there were two putative \low" prices p <p; consumers at this store will buy for two periods. By raising the price slightly, such a store would not lose any customers but would increase pro¯ts. Therefore, the equilibrium low price has to be p
Similarly, the equilibrium high price charged by a store will be p
To solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this model, let¸denote the probability that a¯rm is charging the high price for the planning cycle (recall the planning cycle consists of the two purchase occasion periods). Note that this implies that each¯rm in the symmetric equilibrium will charge a price according to the probability¸for every purchase occasion period. This helps re°ect the reality in actual markets that retailers cannot discriminate consumers based on whether or not they are re-entering the market because they stocked out.
In other words, as consumers enter the store, there is no way for the retailer to distinguish between consumers who are re-entering and those who are not.
As consumers shop randomly, each store receives T =n consumers in period 1. Thus¸T consumers will face stores that charge a high price and therefore buy only one unit. These
consumers will have to re-enter the market to purchase a second unit of the good. The remaining (1 ¡¸)T consumers will encounter low price stores and buy two units in period 1.
Of these, a proportion µ will consume both units, re-enter the market in period 2 and buy an additional unit. The demand for a store when charging a high price S h is,
and the demand when charging the low price, S l , is given by
The¯rst term in the demand functions comes from consumers who shop randomly in thē rst period. The second term comes from consumers who faced a high price store in thē rst period and who therefore re-enter the market. Finally, the third term comes from reentering consumers who faced a low price store in the¯rst period, bought two units, but consumed both the units.
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From the de¯nition of the mixed strategy each¯rm will choose a distribution of the two possible prices to make other¯rms indi®erent between their strategies implying that in equilibrium:
From now on we set c = 0 for ease of exposition. 
Recall that the average price is ¹ p =¸u + (1 ¡¸)p l : Finally we have that p
Using these pricing identities and (5) we have the equilibrium low price to be (assuming E(U s )¸0 which we will indeed show to be true in equilibrium):
The equilibrium can now be derived and is as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If c = 0, a necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is
The equilibrium consists of two prices with
and with¯rms charging the high price with probability
Proof: with those where they stockpile and also consume more of the product. We¯rst examine the special case of pure stockpiling (µ = 0), because this provides us with a benchmark from which to evaluate the incremental e®ect of°exible consumption (µ > 0).
Pure Stockpiling (µ = 0)
Bell et al (1999) show that categories such as bathroom tissue, co®ee, detergents and paper towels exhibit signi¯cant stockpiling in response to a price promotion, however, the stockpiling in these categories is not accompanied by any change in the consumption rate of consumers. This case of pure stockpiling is a special case of our model where µ = 0 which implies that consumers who stockpile two units in the¯rst period do not indulge in excess consumption as a result of this stockpiling (and therefore do not re-enter the market in the second period). The two units are consumed one a-piece in each of two periods.
This case of µ = 0 is the mixed strategy analogue of the Salop and Stiglitz (1982) analysis. Thus, the within-¯rm price distribution in the mixed equilibrium here is analogous to the cross-sectional price distribution in Salop and Stiglitz. Note that without consumption e®ects, the only consumers in the market in the second period are those who encountered a high price in the¯rst period and purchased a single unit. Consequently, the total sales when a store is charging the high price in the symmetric equilibrium is S h
= [(1 +¸)T ]=n
and total sales when a store is charging the low price is S l
= [(2 +¸)T ]=n:
Corollary 1 A mixed strategy equilibrium with promotional pricing for this case exists only if h < u=3. The equilibrium prices are
The presence of consumer stockpiling can induce¯rms to o®er price promotions. The two-price promotional equilibrium occurs only if the holding costs are su±ciently low. If the cost of holding the additional inventory is large, consumers are less disposed to buy for storage and as a result the low-price stores will have to o®er deeply discounted prices to motivate consumers to buy the additional unit. This makes promotional prices unpro¯table and implies that the equilibrium frequency of charging the high price (¸¤) increases with consumer holding costs.
Stockpiling and Consumption µ > 0
Given the analysis so far, we begin with the question: How does the consumption e®ect relate to price competition? Proposition 1 indicates that as in the pure stockpiling case, the holding costs of the consumers have to be su±ciently small for promotions to occur in equilibrium (i.e., h < : The reason for this as follows: Low holding costs imply that¯rms do not have to cut prices signi¯cantly to motivate consumers to buy the additional unit for storage. Furthermore, in the presence of the°exible consumption e®ect¯rms also get the bene¯t of increased demand in the second period (from consumers who stockpiled but indulged in excess consumption, using up both units in period 1). This makes the low-price position so attractive that all¯rms have the incentive to promote with probability one. We investigate the following aspects of the equilibrium: (1) the equilibrium prices and the frequency with which¯rms promote, (2) equilibrium pro¯ts, and (3) the impact of holding costs on the proportion of stores charging a low price. Table 1 provides the details of the equilibrium.
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[ Table 1 about here]
Equilibrium Frequency of Charging the High Price
We begin with¸¤, the equilibrium frequency of charging a high price p
shown that¸¤ decreases with consumption e®ects (i.e., @¸=@µ < 0). The presence of°exible consumption makes it more attractive for any given store to more frequently charge the promotional low price. This low price, in turn, encourages the consumers to stockpile.
Having stockpiled, consumers have a probability µ of consuming the stockpiled unit and thereby increasing the rate of consumption. The e®ect of higher consumption (i.e., a larger value of µ) translates into higher overall market demand at the promotional price. Firms respond in equilibrium by increasing the frequency of promotions.
Equilibrium Prices
The high or regular price (p This implies that despite stockpiling, these consumers might have to re-enter the market and face price uncertainty and the prospect of landing up at a high-priced store. As such, this leads them to have a diminishing marginal utility for the additional units, forcing thē rms who decide to adopt a low price to choose lower promotional prices in equilibrium.
Furthermore (as discussed above), the probability/frequency with which¯rms promote also increases. Thus, the expected number of¯rms that o®er the promotional price also increases with the consumption e®ect. This in turn intensi¯es competition at the lower price point, contributing to lower promotional prices. All this also implies that the average market price, ¹ p, goes down with the consumption e®ect. In other words,¯rms compete more intensely in product categories with a greater consumption e®ect.
Equilibrium Pro¯ts
The symmetric equilibrium pro¯ts for each¯rm are
From equation (14) it is straightforward to note that the equilibrium pro¯ts go down as the consumption e®ect becomes stronger. This also con¯rms the claim that°exible consumption intensi¯es price competition. This is interesting because the consumption e®ect produces some bene¯t (i.e., primary demand can be higher), however¯rms have to pay for this via more intense competition.
Holding Costs
As h increases: (a) the frequency with which stores promote decreases, (b) the average price (¹ p) increases, (c) the promotional price (p frequently. This is evident from the result that¸, the probability of stores charging the high price p ¤ h = u, increases as h increases.
In certain product categories there might be a relationship between the holding costs and the likelihood of additional consumption. In particular, consumers might have a greater propensity to use up inventory in categories with higher holding costs. Note that the e®ects of h and µ on the promoted price, frequency and pro¯ts, when they are independent, work counter to each other. In categories where higher holding costs are positively related to µ we expect price competition to be less intense.
Empirical Analysis
We test three key implications of the theoretical analysis. We focus on the equilibrium frequency distribution or the likelihood of charging the high price (captured by¸) and the equilibrium behavior of product prices. In particular, we consider the ratio of deal and average prices to regular prices in stockpiling and consumption e®ect categories.
1 0
Data
To test the theory we require categories that exhibit either°exible consumption e®ects or pure stockpiling. To aid in category selection we refer back to previous work (Ailawadi and paper towels, respectively. Thus, with two years of price data for each of the 4,313 skus in the data set, we have a potentially large number of observations for use in our analysis.
It is however the case that not all skus are stocked by all stores, for all 104 weeks.
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Before presenting the hypothesis tests and results we¯rst describe the testing strategy.
Our goal is to develop an empirical model that not only re°ects the basic elements of the theory, but also takes into account important aspects of the data (i.e., unobserved nature of key constructs, heterogeneity, etc.).
Empirical Testing Approach
The parameter µ is a key construct in our theory. As noted earlier, µ is a product category characteristic that represents an \ex ante" belief that consumers have about the likelihood of additional consumption, while the particular realization of µ depends on idiosyncratic consumption events. The value of µ a®ects how¯rms set prices in equilibrium. This begs the question: How can we obtain reasonable estimates of µ from the data? To generate category-speci¯c estimates of µ that are consistent with the theory and the structure of the data, we return to the analysis presented in Exhibit 3 in Bell et al (1999, p. 517). The exhibit is reproduced as Table 2 and contains information on the average quantities purchased (Q), average elapsed time between purchases (IP ) and average rate of consumption (Q=IP ) in each of the eight categories. These measures were computed from panel data purchases and therefore re°ect underlying buying patterns within the categories.
||||||||||||||
[ While the (original) Bell et al (1999) exhibit does not provide a direct estimate of µ, it does provide su±cient information from which to generate an estimate. In all eight product categories price promotions lead to statistically signi¯cant increases in quantities purchased.
In the case of the \Stockpiling Only" categories, we see an accompanying increase in the elapsed time between purchases which implies no signi¯cant increase in the rate of consumption. This is exactly the phenomenon presented in earlier in Figure 1 (a) . For the \Increased Consumption" categories, the increased purchase quantity is accompanied by no signi¯cant increase in elapsed time, which suggests an increase in the slope of the consumption line (see Figure 1 (b) ).
An estimate of µ can be derived from the relationship between rates of consumption following purchases on promotion and purchases at regular prices. Let µ equal 1 ¡ r
where r R and r P are the rates of consumption given purchases at regular and promoted prices, respectively. This means that µ = 0 when a promotion-induced increase in purchase quantity is not accompanied by any increase in consumption (this de¯nition is consistent with the assumptions of our theory). When the two consumption rates are di®erent, µ > 0.
2
In the consumption e®ect categories the values of µ are strictly greater than zero (see Table   2 ), which is again consistent with our theory. In estimating the e®ect of µ on dependent measures that capture retail pricing behavior, we will also control for idiosyncratic variation within categories (exact speci¯cations to follow).
Hypothesis Tests and Results
We examine the impact of the consumption e®ect (µ) on: (1) the equilibrium frequency of charging the high price, (2) the equilibrium ratio of deal to regular prices, and (3) the equilibrium ratio of average to regular prices. 
: Equilibrium Frequency of Charging the High Price (¸)
A key analytical result from the model concerns the equilibrium frequency of charging the high price in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
, the equilibrium frequency of charging the high price, should be lower for consumption categories, relative to stockpiling categories.
A simple test of H 1 involves separating the categories into consumption e®ect and stockpiling only groups as shown in Table 2 . Our objective is to show that the average frequency of charging the high price is lower for the consumption e®ect group. In the theoretical modeļ is the equilibrium frequency that retailers choose the high price. In the empirical model we can interpret this as the probability that retailers choose the regular price at each point in time. This implies that at each time period t; for item i in category j; the dependent measurȩ
can be interpreted as the proportion of retailers in the market charging the regular price.
It is a time-dependent proxy frequency of a given store choosing the high price.
3
To compute the dependent measure¸i ; it would also be useful to conduct a test that better connects the theory to the particular characteristics of the data. In the theory, µ is a parameter that captures di®erences across categories, and while it cannot be observed directly in the data it can nevertheless be inferred at the category level (see Table 2 ). In the real data there are two additional sources of variation in µ not captured explicitly by the theory:
(1) variation across items, i = 1; : : : ; I within a category j, and (2) variation over time t = 1; : : : ; T for a particular item i in category j. Thus, the dependent variable of interest in the statistical analysis is not simply¸, but its empirical proxy,¸i j t
. That is, the data can be structured in a natural hierarchy: within a particular category j, there are several items, i = 1; : : : ; I, and for each item i there are multiple observations over time, t = 1; : : : ; T .
In conducting the tests we specify a hierarchical random e®ects model that takes this into account.¸i
where:¯0 Hence, we expect¯2 < 0.
The interaction e®ect µ
is included in the model to account for the possibility that even within categories that display consumption e®ects, there is likely to be variation across items. In particular, large market share brands in consumption-sensitive categories should see increased levels of promotion (¯3 < 0) after the category-level main e®ects are accounted for. We also control for time-varying changes in promotional intensity, through the inclusion of the item and category-speci¯c time varying covariate, T I i j t
. As noted earlier, exploratory analysis revealed that over the two years of the dataset, on average all skus saw increased levels of promotion. Thus, we expect that the equilibrium frequency with which retailers charge the high price should decline over time so¯4 should be negative. (these are also reported in Table 3 ). As one might expect for these types of pricing data, the weekly prices are serially dependent, so that the¯nal model assumes that º parameters of equation (15) are given in Table 3 and a total of 34,141 observations are used in estimation. 
H 2
The ratio of deal to regular prices decreases in categories that exhibit consumption e®ects. ; for reasons given previously we again use the random e®ects formulation of equation (15) As in equation (15), the intercept enters as a random e®ect such that¯0
). µ j and the other covariates de¯ned as before and store level¯xed e®ects are added to the model to control for store-speci¯c di®erences in promotional depth.
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We expect to see¯1 < 0 as consumption e®ects lead to deeper promotions. Following the rationales given in the test of H 1 , we expect greater deals on larger market share brands (¯2 < 0) and a negative interaction e®ect (¯3 < 0).¯4 accounts for changes in deal depth over time.
||||||||||||||
[ Table 4 about here]
As shown in Table 4 , the e®ect of µ on the ratio of deal to regular prices is negative and signi¯cant (¯1 = ¡0:0746, p < 0:0009). The estimates for¯2 and¯3 are not critical to the theory, however, they have plausible magnitudes and expected signs. by o®ering an alternative test of the promotional depth result.
The ratio of average to regular prices decreases in categories that exhibit the consumption e®ect.
We compute the ratios for the average prices to regular prices, R 
[ Table 5 about here]
As shown in Table 5 , the pattern of results is very similar to that for H
2
.¯1 has the expected negative sign and is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero: H 3 is also supported by the data.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides insights into price competition among retailers in categories where consumers can be motivated to buy for storage and future consumption. These are categories that either display the stockpiling e®ect (and exhibit temporary increases in primary demand) and/or experience longer term e®ects through increased consumption. While a number of experimental studies and empirical research e®orts have documented these e®ects, there exists no uni¯ed theoretical research to explain how retail price competition might be governed by the stockpiling and consumption behaviors of consumers.
We present an equilibrium analysis of price competition that traces the relationship between consumer tendencies to increase consumption, and the behavior of¯rms pricing under such conditions. In this setting, the presence of consumer storage and°exible consumption e®ects is su±cient for¯rms to o®er price promotions. This general¯nding highlights a rationale for price promotions that is missing in the theoretical literature. As noted earlier, this could be due to the fact that many researchers have either explicitly or implicitly assumed that price promotions do not increase consumption. Given recent empirical and experimental evidence for the consumption e®ect, it is useful to have a theoretical analysis of promotions that incorporates this behavioral phenomenon.
The theoretical model establishes that the frequency of choosing the high price decreases with consumption e®ects. We identify this new rationale for promotions in a situation where both stores and consumers are ex ante identical in all respects. Our work also represents a departure from most studies in this area that either develop theory or undertake empirical analysis, but not both. In sum, we provide the following new insights:
1. The equilibrium frequency of charging a high price decreases in product categories subject to consumption e®ects.
(c)¯rm pro¯ts also increase.
The theoretical predictions for promotion frequency and promotion depth are tested using price and promotion data from eight product categories. The empirical tests o®er strong support for the implications of the theory. In categories subject to the consumption e®ect, we¯nd: (1) the equilibrium frequency of charging the high price decreases, (2) promotional depth increases as the ratio of deal to regular prices is lower, and (3) the ratio of average to regular prices is also lower. Retailers' pricing behavior suggests they are cognizant of whether products are likely to exhibit°exible consumption patterns. In this sense, thē ndings support the notion of a market equilibrium in which consumers respond to retailer prices di®erentially according to category characteristics and retailers endogenously set prices with this in mind (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999).
In conclusion, we o®er a new rationale for price promotions: Firm response to stockpiling and°exible consumption behavior of consumers. The e®ect of price promotions do not exclusively pertain to brand switching. Instead, price promotions can connect to fundamental consumer dynamics such as time-shifting of purchase quantities and°exible consumption behavior. Our theory highlights a mechanism for this connection, and provides support for its validity by carefully examining empirically observed patterns of price promotions in real markets. 
